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BOOK REVIEWS

Do THE POOR WANT TO WORK? A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
OF WORK ORIENTATIONS. By Leonard Goodwin. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1972. Pp. 178. $6.50 cloth, $2.50 paper.
Most successful Americans would agree that a steady job is
a good thing, providing not only money but self-respect and a
purpose in life. Dismayed by the failure of thousands of poor people
to hold steady jobs, they often assume that the poor stay on welfare
because they don't like to work-in short, because they are lazy.
This assumption colors several aspects of federal welfare programs,
yet few have asked whether it is a valid guide for policymakers.
The title of a recently published study by Leonard Goodwin gets
to the point: DO THE POOR WANT TO WORK?
This question has a direct bearing on governmental efforts
to reduce poverty and unemployment through work-training programs aimed at replacing welfare with "workfare," and on proposals to institute some form of guaranteed annual income. Goodwin
notes that work-training programs will fail if the poor have little
interest in work, while a guaranteed income might induce them
to leave the work force. If, on the other hand, poor people do
want to work, a guaranteed subsistence income wouldn't discourage
them from working, and the current difficulties of work-training
programs would have to be explained by something other than
the psychology of the poor.
Goodwin, a member of Brookings' Governmental Studies staff,
has sought answers to questions underlying what is generally called
the "welfare mess." Do poor people have outlooks on work basically
different from those of regularly employed persons? Do poor mothers really prefer to stay on welfare rather than work to support
their families? Is there a caste system or "culture of poverty"
that distinguishes poor from middle-class families?
In his search for the link between a person's psychological
makeup and his performance in the job market, Goodwin measured
what he calls "work orientations"-psychological attributes reflected
in questionnaire items that cluster together statistically and have
psychological meaning. Four of these orientations are particularly
important. Life aspirations are derived from questionnaire items
such as "having a nice place to live" and "having a regular
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job" rated on a four-point scale ranging from "best way of life"
to "worst way of life." Other major orientations are the work
thic, or degree to which a person identifies his self-esteem with
work; lack of confidence, or belief that "luck" or "knowing the
right people" determines success; and acceptability of welfare as
a source of income.
During the course of Goodwin's study, the work orientations
questionnaire was administered to more than 2,000 poor peopleblack and white, male and female, young and adult-in Baltimore
and at five other places across the country. They included longand short-term welfare mothers and their teen-age sons, male teenagers in a poor all-black community near the District of Columbia,
and more than a thousand welfare recipients enrolled in the federally supported Work Incentive Program (WIN).
Goodwin compared their responses with those of some 2,000
people having steady employment, including 500 black families who
had succeeded at work and 175 white middle-class families living
in the same Baltimore neighborhoods as the successful black families. The picture that emerged differs sharply from the stereotyped
view of the poor.
0 Welfare recipients, whatever their race or time spent on welfare, have essentially the same work ethic and life aspirations
as do employed middle-class people.
* Teen-age welfare boys from fatherless homes maintain a strong
work ethic even though they have been on welfare almost their
entire lives. The widespread belief that welfare weakens the work
ethic of young men is not borne out.
* Welfare mothers have a significant influence on their sons'
orientations, contributing to high life aspirations and a strong work
ethic. Middle-class parents have a negligible influence, probably
because their children's work orientations are shaped by institutions
outside the family.
* Black persons are much less confident of their ability to
succeed at work than are whites. Surprisingly, blacks who have
moved up out of the ghetto are as insecure as black welfare
recipients; whites, on the other hand, are confident of*their ability
to succeed even if they are on welfare.
0 Poor people with the strongest work ethic show the greatest
lack of confidence, suggesting that persons who most closely identify
their self-esteem with work suffer the greatest loss 'of confidence
when they fail.
* Willingness to accept welfare follows economic rather than
racial lines. Whether black or white, the poor interviewed for the
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study showed greater acceptance of welfare than did affluent blacks
and whites. None of the poor groups saw welfare as a threat
to their life goals 6r work ethic.
Especially significant were the results of part of the study
focusing on women in the WIN program. First, Goodwin found
that the black mothers who most readily accepted welfare when
they entered WIN were the least likely to work after leaving the
program. Despite their high life aspirations and work ethic, they
tended to give up on work effort and to go on welfare. According
to Goodwin, this doesn't happen because they reject the significance
of work but because they have failed repeatedly at work and
find welfare an acceptable alternative. Second, Goodwin discovered
that mothers who leave the WIN program without getting a jobwho fail again in the work world-find welfare more acceptable
than they did when they entered training. Together, these insights
suggest that the WIN program may actually reduce the employability of many participants.
If, as Goodwin contends, poor people of all ages and races
identify their self-esteem with work as strongly as do the nonpoor,
why aren't they working and moving out of poverty? Why are
welfare rolls increasing rather than decreasing?
This paradox would be readily explained if the poor who were
interviewed for the study gave the answers they thought middleclass interviewers wanted to hear, but Goodwin used statistical
methods to adjust the data for bias of that kind. In his view
the most plausible explanation is that a person's work activity
is determined more by his beliefs and intentions than by his goals.
Black women on welfare may have work as a goal, yet go on
accepting welfare because they have failed at work and believe
they would fail if they tried again.
Neither a caste system nor the culture of poverty thesis can
satisfactorily account for these findings. Goodwin offers a different
interpretation that emphasizes unequal opportunity-the fact that
American society restricts but does not completely bar advancement for blacks. Since blacks have to work in situations less favorable to advancement than those affecting whites, they show a high
level of insecurity whether they are on welfare or have managed
to move out of the ghetto. Lack of equal opportunity more than
anything else may explain the growth of welfare rolls.
Goodwin's study has several implications for public policy.
For example, it is commonly argued that welfare benefits should
be tied to a work requirement because work is psychologically
good for welfare mothers and provides a model for their children.
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But even long-term welfare mothers and their teen-age sons already
have a strong work ethic and don't need to be taught the importance
of work. Goodwin contends that what they need is a chance to
experience success in jobs that pay enough to support them.
The current WIN program has failed, Goodwin says, in the
sense that most participants end up without jobs. He points out
that a work requirement for welfare mothers could mean pushing
more of them through WIN even though 80 per cent of them would
not obtain jobs in the open market, or it could mean forcing
them to fill the lowest-paid jobs in American society. Either
course would increase their psychological dependence on welfare
and discourage further work effort. On the other hand, Goodwin
believes that welfare mothers and their children could be publicly
supported at a decent level without damaging their work ethic,
provided that support were given in a way that conveyed no social
stigma or implication of failure.
Important though it is, Goodwin views income as only one
factor in a family's escape from poverty. His data on successful
black families suggest the psychological stress of rising from the
lower to the middle class, and not every poor person may want
or be able to manage it. Hence an increase in income of a few
hundred dollars a year might raise a family above some economically defined poverty line, but it would be unlikely to generate a
burst of hope and confidence. Economic measurements may show
many persons rising above poverty because of government welfare
payments, while socially and economically the urban ghettos remain
unchanged.
Goodwin emphasizes that this is not a criticism of economic
analysis or of proposals for guaranteeing income to the poor, but
a basis for moving beyond the common belief that a guaranteed
income would impair work incentives. His study suggests that the
plight of the poor cannot be attributed to deviant goals or a deviant
psychology, and that the poor are no more likely to settle for
a poverty-level income and stop working than are middle-class
people.
JAMES

D. FARRELL*

* Ph.B., 1948, M.A., 1955, University of Chicago; Brookings' Executive Editor, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
This book review appears in 9 THE BROOKINGS BULLETIN No. 3 (1972). Reprinted
with the permission of the Brookings Institution and the author.
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